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ABSTRACT 
 
The pharmaceutical industry is rooted in the ability to research, develop, 
market, and distribute safe and effect drugs that meet the need of patients.  In 
many cases pharmaceutical companies attempt to accelerate their drug 
development efforts by acquiring other companies for their pipeline; however, 
there may be missed opportunities to protect, foster, and metabolize a core asset 
throughout the acquisition process: innovation.   
 
The following capstone, presented as a single case study, focuses on 
innovation retention and protection through the lens of an acquired organization.  
While plenty of research has been conducted to prescribe how companies can 
become more innovative, this capstone explores practical methods for protecting 
existing innovative assets while reviewing challenges and opportunities through 
an organizational dynamics lens.  The overall goal of this paper is to establish a 
suggest framework for protecting innovation in order to maximize organizational 
effectiveness. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
This capstone examines how an organization protects and promotes 
innovation following an acquisition within the life sciences industry.  This 
analysis—presented as a case study—will focus on the acquired organization’s 
methods for sustaining innovation.  Particular attention will be paid to the 
changes in the organizational environment from the pre- to the post-acquisition 
while studying methodologies that did and did not work.  The overall goal is to 
provide future “acquirees” with a roadmap for sustaining an innovative culture by 
collecting various examples from the acquired organization in this case and by 
assessing the available literature. 
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Introduction 
 
In keeping with the life sciences theme I’d like to illustrate the causal 
relationships between acquirer and “acquiree” by presenting as metaphors the 
concepts of pharmacodynamics and pharmacokinetics—terms that are typically 
assigned to research laboratories and clinical settings.  These are disciplines that 
study the relational effects of the drug product on the consumer 
(pharmacodynamics; herein PD) and of the consumer on the drug product 
(pharmacokinetics; herein PK).  In other words, how does A impact B and how 
does B impact A.  Most non-scientists might not find this field of study to be 
particularly interesting; however, as a student of Organizational Dynamics I have 
begun to consider how PK/PD can be useful in examining organizations’ working 
harmoniously. 
In fact it has become most interesting to me to offer a case study of the 
organization that has been at the epicenter of my Organization Dynamics 
learnings.  Avid Radiopharmaceuticals (herein Avid) has historically been a 
small, start-up organization that has focused on developing innovative 
diagnostics products for molecular imaging of neurodegenerative diseases, 
namely Alzheimer’s disease (herein AD).  In its ten-year existence Avid has 
made tremendous strides in augmenting AD clinical research with the hopes of 
supporting the development of safe and effective therapies.  Yet this case study 
offers more than a history of Avid’s innovation because in the fifth year of Avid’s 
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existence it was acquired by Eli Lilly & Co. (herein Lilly), a large pharmaceutical 
organization and the producers of blockbuster drugs such as Cialis®, 
Cymbalta®, Prozac®, and Zyprexa®.   
Throughout this capstone we will examine the dichotomy of Avid pre-
acquisition and post-acquisition while considering how innovation is/was 
protected as Avid’s paramount asset.  The goal is to collect methodologies, 
which may then be more generally applicable, for protecting and spreading 
innovation from Avid’s perspective and to gather details for which practices did—
or did not—work.    
This is, however, not a capstone designed to criticize process-heavy 
bureaucratic organizations nor will we praise innovation-centric “startups.”  In 
some cases we will discover that Lilly demonstrates some dynamic 
characteristics that Avid will eventually emulate.  Nonetheless, while the 
bureaucratic model might suggest that size and creativity are inversely 
proportional (Navaretti et al, 2013), we are experiencing a rebirth of organizations 
of all types that are willing to learn from each other in order to optimize the 
ecosystem that can continue to face new and old challenges alike.  The new 
model is characterized by or derives from the ability to reflect, exchange, and 
apply new learnings.  It is rooted in an organization’s commitment and ability to 
innovate.  To make something new, or better.   
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Background of Alzheimer’s Disease and Context 
  
While the following paper will not focus on the scientific details of AD, it 
feels appropriate to spend some time providing a non-scientific summary of the 
disease itself.  I am not, by any means, a scientist.  My role within Avid is an 
operations/project manager, and I personally believe that this summary will help 
provide the necessary context to better understand how continuity of innovation 
is helping to find a cure faster. 
AD was attributed to Alois Alzheimer following his 1907 published account 
of a 51-year-old patient named Auguste D (Alzheimer, 1907).  Auguste D had 
suffered from various health conditions ranging from hallucinations, memory 
impairment, aggressive behavior, and disorientation.  Following her death, 
Alzheimer performed a postmortem histological analysis—via autopsy—of 
Auguste’s brain and found unusually dense bundles of amyloid-β (Aβ) and 
accumulated tau protein (Allsop, 2000; Ittner & Götz, 2011).   Thus the presence 
of accumulated Aβ and tau proteins have since become the two hallmark 
neuropathological indicators for diagnosing AD (Allsop, 2000).   
The problem that the medical community faced in 1907 was determining 
the presence of these two hallmark indicators in vivo.  While scientists and 
researchers were able to study various therapeutics and effects of treatment, 
they were not able to unequivocally determine if a patient’s ailments were caused 
by chronic alcoholism, psychosis, dementia, or AD (Arieti, 1946; Bresler, 1912; 
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Osnato, 1923).  While research was still conducted, the inability to determine the 
presence or absence of Aβ and tau proteins hindered the scientific communities' 
ability to conduct controlled studies to include patients that fit the AD criteria 
(Jorm et al, 1991; Cohene et al, 2005).  The community was left with collecting 
uncontrolled case studies for decades. 
This method of data collection continued for almost a century until 2004 
when the first radioactive amyloid tracer, Pittsburgh Compound-B (PiB), was 
successfully used to determine the presence of Aβ in vivo.  When the brain was 
imaged using positron emission tomography (PET) cameras and PiB, 
researchers were able to demonstrate “marked retention of PIB” in regions of the 
brain known to contain amyloid deposits (Klunk et al, 2004).  Although PiB was 
the first ligand that offered hope for researchers, it had a very limited half-life—
roughly 20 minutes—and almost no chance of being used widely through clinical 
research due to a complex manufacturing process (Furst & Kerchner, 2012).   
 Avid—as we will review in Chapter 3 of this capstone—, previously a non-
innovation- focused organization, was able to leverage this existing technology 
into an innovative imaging agent that could change the dynamics of AD research.  
Thus we will present Avid’s experiences as part of a case study.  We will 
investigate how Avid developed into an innovative organization that could 
transform AD drug development and how it worked to protect its ability to 
innovate following an acquisition. 
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Limitations of Research 
  
This evaluation of innovation will consider a multitude of perspectives from 
various peer-reviewed journals, books, periodicals, and presentations; however, 
not all perspectives can be shared within a limited analysis.  Additionally, the 
evaluation will include data collected from two organizations within the life 
sciences industry—Avid and Lilly.  Although this organization has experienced a 
transition from pre- to post-acquisition, it does not necessarily embody the 
actions, performance, thoughts, and opinions of every pharmaceutical company 
following an acquisition.  This, after all, is the spirit of a single-case study. 
 For instance, consider that many organizations are acquired for rights to 
their pipeline and not for the staff responsible for creating such a pipeline.  That 
is, head count is often a casualty in acquisitions.  The organization reviewed in 
this analysis did not lose head count.  When compared to organizations who did 
lose head count, one might expect a vastly different set of results from 
interviews. 
 Additionally, the case study and subsequent analysis use historic and 
current events.  Considering the nature of drug development and the sensitivities 
of intellectual property we will refrain from discussing any data that are not in the 
public domain.   
 
Personal Note: Why I Am Writing About This 
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Since this capstone project has absorbed a considerable amount of 
personal time, I wanted to ensure it would be applicable to my career and to the 
careers of others.  During my second semester in the Organizational Dynamics 
program I received sage advice from a trusted professor who shared that a 
capstone should be an aggregation of my learning with the goal of having a 
specific expertise by the end of the program.  That professor was Ravi 
Chaturvedi, a former VP at Proctor and Gamble, a brilliant, quiet, and humble 
business mind. This advice has resonated with me throughout the program.  I’ve 
found myself most interested in organizational behavior and understanding how 
corporate culture is developed and ultimately sustained or changed.   
Developing ideas for the capstone suddenly started to crystalize once I 
was introduced to Gary Hamel's The Future of Management and Robert Quinn’s 
Becoming a Master Manager (Hamel, 2007; Quinn, 2010).  Both books were 
assigned reading materials from Janet Greco’s Perspectives on Organizational 
Dynamics course that I attended during the spring 2015 semester.  I derived 
value from Hamel’s perspective about management innovation and how to 
transform organizations (Hamel, 2007).  When paired with Quinn’s viewpoint on 
applicable management techniques—namely reserving time for creative thinking 
and innovation—I was certain I would have a complete capstone rich with 
application. 
Additionally, researching Hamel and Quinn lead to uncovering 
Schumpeter’s Models of Economic Growth, a thesis that suggests new products 
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and continual improvements of existing products would ultimately lead to growth 
and development (Schumpeter, 1912).  Schumpeter’s theories, first published in 
1912, focus on the role of entrepreneurs and their ability to demonstrate 
innovation’s centralized role in growth.    
The end goal is application in my current and future roles.  At the start of 
this capstone I have been working through the process of the acquisition and 
making myself familiar with the challenges that an acquired company 
experiences.  In terms of future roles, Lilly will likely continue to acquire smaller 
organizations or in-license drugs.  By understanding the benefits of innovation as 
an acquirable asset, I will be primed to support our company through exceptional 
transformation.   
 
Audience 
 
 My target audience has a relatively wide range.  I believe the research 
compiled within this capstone could provide benefit to a multitude of 
pharmaceutical stakeholders, namely acquirers and “acquirees.”  This capstone 
will result in concrete examples of what worked and what did not work in one 
typical case.  As such, this capstone might be considered a useful guide to post-
acquisition innovation excellence.  Furthermore, for organizations that routinely 
invest in external entities, the materials collected within this paper can help 
exploit innovativeness for the next acquisition(s).  After all, if an organization is 
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being acquired for its innovative staff/culture/product, it makes sense for the 
acquiring organization’s leadership to foster and metabolize the innovation that 
the buyer is paying to acquire.   
 Additionally, leading successful change doesn’t need to be restricted to 
the pharmaceutical industry.  Although not covered within this capstone, 
industries ranging from education, technology, and government might benefit 
from the analysis.  If a highly regulated industry can find ways to optimize their 
processes, one might suspect that a lesser regulated organization can emulate 
these enhancements.   
 
Capstone Outline 
 
 The remaining chapters have been organized as follows: Chapter 2 will 
examine, via the literature, the concept of innovation: what is it, why is it valued in 
drug development, how does leadership impact innovation, and why is innovation 
ultimately needed in AD research?  The purpose is to demonstrate that 
innovation is a highly desired trait and that Avid fits certain defined criteria.  
Chapter 2 will also discuss the value of studying innovation through the 
framework of a single-case study.   
Chapter 3 will dive into the case study to help peel back the layers of 
innovation’s role in a dynamic ecosystem.  The case study format closely 
emulates the style utilized by Thomas DeLong in his Professional Services: Text 
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and Cases casebook (DeLong, 2003).  This format described the organizations 
past then present in order to maximize context as the case unfolds.  The case 
study is framed to provide a comparison of Lilly and Avid—how they are different, 
how are they similar, and how could they co-exist following an acquisition.  This 
Chapter will study the experiences collected from both Lilly and Avid’s 
perspectives, thus presenting a unique look at how innovation was protected as 
an asset through a Lilly lens and an Avid lens.  We will also study what 
threatens/threatened innovation and what techniques were used to ensure the 
success of the acquisition.  In short, Chapter 3 will provide the “case” in this case 
study. 
 In contrast to the aforementioned “case,“ Chapter 4 will provide the 
”study."  Although there will be some limitations to the scope, the goal is to 
observe how Lilly and Avid employees visualize the prevalence and utilization (or 
lack thereof?) of their organizations' asset of innovation.  We will evaluate how 
innovation was protected and the lessons learned from my experiences.  Chapter 
4 will also provide a number of complementary organizational dynamics lenses 
that were used to better understand the post-acquisition interactions between 
Avid and Lilly. 
 Last, Chapter 5 will provide a conclusion by reviewing personal reflections 
on what was learned throughout the capstone process. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
On Saturday August 22nd, 2015, Frank rolled out of bed, changed into his 
running clothes, laced up his shoes and headed out for his morning run.  Frank is 
a man of habit.  His route hasn’t changed in the 30 years that he’s been living in 
his home but that day was different.  While running through town he became lost.  
He stopped, panicked, and remembered he had been running with his phone (he 
had been using it for music during his run).  Frank called his wife and had 
somehow forgotten her name.  Frank continued to panic, as did his wife when 
she picked him up in their car several minutes later.  By the time she had arrived, 
he had managed to remember where he was and his wife’s name.  Frank 
chalked this occurrence up to “forgetfulness.”  The problem was that this wasn’t 
the first time this scenario occurred.  These situations had become more frequent 
over the summer of 2015. 
Unfortunately this isn’t a rare occurrence.  Frank is one of an estimated 
5.3 million Americans are living with the memory-robbing disease (Alzheimer’s 
Association, 2015).  The Alzheimer’s Association has deemed AD to be an 
epidemic stemming from the large aging baby-boomer generation.  In fact, the 
projected number of American’s living with AD in 2050 will skyrocket to 13.8 
million, barring the development of medical breakthroughs (Alzheimer’s 
Association, 2015). 
Yet finding a cure, or even slowing the progression, of AD has been a 
challenge facing the medical community since 1907 when Alois Alzheimer first 
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reported his account of Auguste D (Alzheimer, 1907).  One report, published in 
2014, has suggested that there is an extremely high attrition rate among clinical 
trials focused on finding a disease-modifying agent.  To be precise, the failure 
rate was 99.6%, although it should be noted that the 0.4% successful trials only 
help treat the symptoms of AD, not the underlying pathology (Cummings, 
Morstorf, & Zhong, 2014; Becker, Greig, & Giacobini, 2008).  This failure rate is 
statistically higher than studies focusing on cancer and all other therapeutic 
areas, 95% and 90%, respectively (Kola, 2004).  In other words, from a historical 
perspective, it has been easier to cure or slow cancer than AD (Kola, 2004).   
Despite these clinical failures, the medical community and the 
pharmaceutical industry have been relentless with their continued efforts for 
finding disease-modifying interventions.  Industry leaders recognized that a cure, 
in many ways, represents the Holy Grail (Holtzman et al., 2012).  In terms of 
purely enterprise success, a cure, or a means of slowing the progression of the 
disease, could fetch $15-20B in annual revenues (Holtzman et al, 2012). 
These trends and consequent potential forced the AD research community 
to consider changing their approach for conducting drug development research.  
Industry leaders have embraced these challenges citing that the pressures of 
R&D can often serve as a catalyst for introducing new innovations into the 
discovery process itself (Kola, 2008).  These innovations hold the promise to 
“deliver the greatest opportunity and leverage for bringing important efficiencies 
to big pharma R&D” (Kola, 2008).   
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By the end of 2009 pharmaceutical organizations were hemorrhaging cash 
on expensive AD clinical trials that hadn’t yielded a quality product.  In fact 
analysts have projected the costs of these studies ranged from $1.7B – $5B 
(Mullin, 2014; Herper, 2013).  The AD research community recognized the need 
to change their drug development methods and began looking for creative ways 
to design trials that optimized their likelihood for success. 
It was around this time in 2009 that Lilly began looking for innovative 
solutions to help improve AD trial outcomes.  This is when they found a potential 
partner to help them revise their approach for conducting AD trials.  What is it 
that Avid was able to do to help an expansively large company like Lilly?  To 
better understand let us first review the nature of innovation. What is it and why 
does it matter? 
 
What is Innovation? 
 
Since there is such perceived interchangeability in the use of the terms 
“creativity” and “innovation,” it feels imperative to add clarification of the 
definitions used herein.  Some researchers and theorists define creativity 
according to the characteristics of the person whereas others will focus on the 
process (Amabile, 1988).  One definition, specifically focused on the person, 
suggests using the term creativity to “refer to the constellation of personality and 
intellectual traits shown by individuals who, when given a measure of free rein, 
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spend significant amounts of time engaged in the creative process” (Findlay and 
Lumsden, 1988).  Meanwhile, process-centric definitions suggests that “creativity 
is the emergences in action of a novel relational product, growing out of the 
uniqueness of the individual on the one hand, and the materials, events, people 
or circumstances of his life on the other” (Rogers, 1954). 
As an extension, many definitions of innovation explicitly include the ideas 
of creativity's being successfully executed by a larger group.  Within an 
organizational and management perspective, Drucker suggests that innovation is 
the “purposeful and organized search for changes” (Drucker, 1985) while other 
thought leaders define it as “any idea, practice, or material artifact perceived to 
be new by the relevant unit of adoption” (Zaltman, Duncan, & Holbeck, 1973).  
Kanter adds that innovation is the “process of bringing any new, problem-solving 
idea into use” and adds that “innovation is the generation, acceptance, and 
implementation of new ideas, processes, products, or services” (Kanter, 1984). 
Additionally Joseph Alois Schumpeter, an economist in the first half of the 
twentieth century, pointed to the role of innovation and entrepreneurship in 
economic growth.  Schumpeter initially acknowledged that innovation started with 
“new combinations” and an entrepreneur’s ability to carry out the combination to 
the marketplace (Schumpeter, 1912; Schumpeter, 1934).  Thus, he 
acknowledged the need for creativity and focus to drive innovative in the 
marketplace as a means of spurring economic growth. 
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As a clarifying point, there is a distinct difference between innovation and 
invention.  Invention refers to the creation of a product or the creation of a new 
process while innovation focuses on the improvement or significant contribution 
to an existing product, service, or process (Grasty, 2012).  Additionally, the 
concept of diffusion can be described as the spreading of innovation.  (Grasty, 
2012). 
 
Characteristics of Innovation 
 
In his Theory of Economic Development Schumpeter defines the 
characteristics of an innovation (refer to Figure 1).  Accordingly a change can be 
categorized as innovation per se by meeting one or more of the following criteria: 
 
Figure 1: Schumpeter's Characteristics of Innovation (Schumpeter, 1934) 
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Based on Schumpeter’s theory it appears as though Avid fits at least the 
first three criteria outlined, thus laying claim to a bona fide innovative 
organization in the Schumpeterian models.  Refer to Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Schumpeter's Characteristics of Innovation and Avid 
Schumpeter’s Criteria 
Avid’s Alignment with Schumpeterian 
Model 
Yes / No 
The launch of a new 
product or a new 
species of an existing 
product 
Avid has successfully launched at least one 
product that was widely regarded as the first 
of its kind 
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Schumpeter’s Criteria 
Avid’s Alignment with Schumpeterian 
Model 
Yes / No 
Application of new 
methods of 
production or sales of 
a product that is not 
yet proven in industry 
Avid has managed to innovate for both the 
production of AV45 and the sales of AV45.  
From a production side, Avid was able to 
modify the manufacturing process to use 18F-
labeled ligands to ensure a longer shelf life.  
From a sales perspective, Avid and Lilly 
coupled AV45 with future therapeutics.  This 
will require that AV45 is used to determine the 
effectiveness of future therapies, thus 
ensuring sales 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opening of a new 
market that has not 
been represented in 
industry 
Up until 4 years ago radiotracers were almost 
entirely used to the US and EU marketplace; 
however, in order to pave the way for future 
therapies, Avid has developed new 
manufacturing facilities in emerging markets 
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Schumpeter’s Criteria 
Avid’s Alignment with Schumpeterian 
Model 
Yes / No 
Acquisition of new 
sources of raw 
materials or semi-
finished goods 
Avid’s history or projected future does not 
seem to fit this criterion 
 
 
 
 
New industry 
structure such as the 
creation/destruction 
of a monopoly 
position 
Avid operates in a competitive environment.  
Therefore Avid does not fit this criterion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Another factor to consider is that innovation is a continuous process.  This 
is widely true in most industries (consider what a car or computer looked like 
thirty years ago) and is especially true in the life sciences industry.   Kline and 
Rosenberg help illustrate that a single innovation is often the result of a lengthy 
process involving many interrelated parts, or departments (Kline & Rosenberg, 
1986).  They share that: 
“it is a serious mistake to treat an innovation as if it were a well-defined, 
homogenous thing that could be identified as entering the economy at a 
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precise date – or becoming available at a precise point in time… The fact 
is that most important innovations go through drastic changes in their 
lifetimes – changes that may, and often do, totally transform their 
economic significance. The subsequent improvements in an invention 
after its first introduction may be vastly more important, economically, than 
the initial availability of the invention in its original form” (Kline and 
Rosenberg, 1986) 
Like Schumpeter, Kline and Rosenberg recognize that innovations are 
often built on previous innovations or inventions and that continually attaining 
innovation is a journey of collective achievement.  Kline and Rosenberg’s Theory 
seemingly suggests the need to apply a systems perspective rather than to focus 
solely on separable innovations or individual creativity. 
 
Defining Innovation for Our Case Study 
 
For purposes of this case study we will adopt a combined definition of 
Kanterian, Schumpeterian, and Kline/Rosenberg’s innovation (Kanter, 1984; 
Kline and Rosenberg, 1986; Schumpeter, 1912; Schumpeter, 1934).  Kanter’s 
definition offers an intriguing element that the other definitions seemingly miss: 
implementation. Kanter's innovation is fundamentally different in the sense that it 
includes focus and direction.  Without focus and direction, creative concepts can 
manifest themselves in a variety of ways.  Schumpeterian innovation also 
considers innovation’s economic impact.  Considering the for-profit nature of 
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pharmaceuticals, it feel important to add this element—focus and direction to 
profit—to our proposed definition.  Last, Kline and Rosenberg’s systems 
perspective is pervasive in Avid’s style of innovation.  Avid, much like other 
pharmaceutical organizations, has built a sub-industry based on a collection of 
previously discovered technologies. 
Thus, the combined meaning moving forward advocates that innovation is 
“the systematic generation, acceptance, and implementation of new ideas, 
processes, products, or services with the intent to drive economic growth in the 
marketplace” (Kanter, 1984; Kline and Rosenberg, 1986; Schumpeter, 1912; 
Schumpeter, 1934).  Now that a definition has been established for an innovative 
organization we can explore why innovation matters in the realm of drug 
development. 
 
The Value of Innovation in Drug Development 
 
The need for innovation in the work place is hardly a novel concept.  
There is something inherently human about the inclination to think about new and 
better ways of doing things and trying them out in practice (Lawrence & Nohria, 
2002).  This is especially natural in a capitalist economy.  Reflecting on the 
impact innovation has had on life sciences, consider a world without vaccines, 
anesthesia, HIV/AIDS treatments, and modern medical imaging techniques.  
These products and procedures have been important medical contributions over 
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the past century in the sense that they have improved quality of life; however, 
from an economics perspective these innovation have provided an enormous 
contribution to economic growth (Hanush, 2007), reflecting the composite 
definition of innovation offered above. 
The pharmaceutical industry is considered a highly research-intensive 
field and is at the “far end of the continuum of industry sectors in terms of 
innovation being a dominant feature of the generic business model rather than an 
afterthought” (Coombs & Metcalfe, 2002).  Pharmaceutical organizations, both 
large and small, are considerably volatile, uncertain, and risky.  These 
characteristics are, in fact, rooted in the drug development process itself since 
drug development is a high-risk/high-reward venture.  Development timelines 
tend to be lengthy, require large amounts of capital to coordinate, and despite the 
great amount of effort to predict the clinical trial outcomes, there are often failures 
that send clinicians back to the drawing board (Coombs & Metcalfe, 2002). 
The pharmaceutical industry has been in a state of flux for the past two 
decades, partly due to problems surrounding failures in research productivity.  
Innovative research is critical to pharma since it provides companies with the 
ability to continually create new revenue streams (often through Schumpeterian 
innovation), remain commercially relevant, and “reinvest” into corporate research 
and development (Schumpeter, 1912).  Yet, in order to achieve these goals small 
and large pharma organizations are required to roll out new products every year 
(Horrobin, 2000). 
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 What has become particularly intimidating are the sky-rocketing costs for 
producing a new drug.  Based on the assumptions by Forbes, the cost of each 
new drug will cost roughly $5B, which is mostly due to funding the 95% of drugs 
that fail in clinical trials due to safety or efficacy (Herper, 2013).  Although this 
number seems exceptionally high, this still doesn’t account for the cost created 
by the new drug development landscape that has waved goodbye the one-sized-
fits-all drugs and has accepted the need to design tailored therapeutics (Kalia, 
2013), a notion that suggests that drugs are now designed with the end users' 
unique characteristics in mind.   
Theoretically, developing new drugs will never go away as long as there 
are unmet needs in the medical community and the industry remains lucrative; 
however, the projected costs for developing one successful drug need to be 
addressed.   The ballooning cost of development is putting a new focus on how 
companies can develop drugs faster and cheaper.  An infusion of innovative 
products or process improvements might be just what the doctor ordered for an 
industry faced with looming financial concerns (Herper, 2013) 
Part of the industry has responded to financial pressures by attempting to 
streamline their processes solely by focusing on external investments.  In such 
cases large pharma absorbs start-up companies that are on the fringe.  This is 
commonly done in order to acquire an early stage compound that market 
research determined could yield enough revenue to keep their heads above 
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water (Horrobin, 2000).  The problem with this model is three-fold as described in 
Figure 2 below. 
 
Figure 2: Potential Problems with Acquisitions 
 
 
Interestingly, when compared to their Big Pharma colleagues, Lilly has 
historically shied away from acquiring companies to bolster their pipeline (Truss, 
2014).  Instead Lilly has relied on a more traditional, self-funding technique.  
Figure 3 provides an illustration of the monetary value of acquisitions across Big 
Pharma companiesi (Truss, 2014) 
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Figure 3: Value of Acquisition by Top Pharma Companies (1994-2014) (Truss, 
2014) 
 
 
Note: while there are plenty of case studies worth being written about one 
large pharma company acquiring another large pharma company (e.g. Pfizer 
purchasing Wyeth), this analysis review will focus on the numerous occasions 
where a large pharma company acquires a smaller, privately held company.   
A case can be made that R&D in big pharmaceutical organizations are 
experiencing a paradigm shift and the ripple effect can be problematic for an 
industry rooted in finding new therapies and diagnostics tools.  As pharma 
continues to acquire and merge in favor of streamlining development processes, 
the corporations become bigger and as a result, more bureaucratic (DiMasi, 
Grabowski, & Vernon, 1995; Califf, 2006).  In many cases innovation and free-
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thinking are replaced by standards, checklists, and work instructions that dictate 
what can and cannot be done.  At times it becomes evident that processes have 
become a surrogate for creativity (Califf, 2006). 
 In an ever evolving marketplace it has become critical to think beyond 
today’s balance sheet as the sole criterion for organizational and R&D decisions 
and consider how establishing a qualitatively distinct balance sheet—an  
environment and culture that welcomes thought-provoking research—could shift 
the way big pharma thinks.  Consider the evolution of non-pharmaceutical 
companies who welcomed these paradigm shifts—W.L. Gore & Associates, 
Google, and Whole Foods (Hamel, 2007).  These are organizations who 
fundamentally adopted novel approaches in ‘how’ to do their organizational and 
business work and have since succeeded with defining innovation in their 
respective industries.   
Pharma is awaiting their next revolution and it’s only a matter of when, or 
who, that will bring us into the new drug development ecosystem (Greiner, 1998).  
In theory drug developers look to their leadership for direction, and possibly 
permission, for how to act, think, and produce. 
 
Why is Innovation Needed in the AD Research Community? 
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The National Institutes of Health (NIH) and National Institute on Aging 
(NIA) supported a retrospective analysis to determine why so many AD drugs fail 
in clinical trials.  Their report, published in 2008, identified a series of factors that 
shed some light on the pattern of failed trials (Becker, Greig, & Giacobini, 2008).  
While the report called out several control issues relative to blinding/unblinding 
studies (effectively controlling placebo and active treatment) and 
investigator/publication bias, they also cited key problems relative to the 
“population selection” for many of these clinical trials.  The NIH suggested that 
many clinical studies have been enrolling patients that may not have AD 
pathology (Becker, Greig, & Giacobini, 2008).   
“Population selection," or selection criteria, is an important point that we 
ought to link back to Chapter 1.  As noted, a patient only has AD if there is 
evidence of accumulated Aβ.  So what happens when a drug that has been 
designed to “flush out” accumulated Aβ is studied in a clinical trial that has been 
enrolled with fifty-percent of subjects with AD pathology and fifty-percent without 
AD pathology (Doody, 2014; Sullivan, 2014; Karran & Hardy, 2014)?  The data 
effectively become diluted to the point that an efficacy claim cannot be made.  
Thus, a drug that might have done its job in the right population is destined to be 
shelved or retested.  Or is it? 
This was the conundrum facing AD drug developers through the early 
2000s.  Many companies, including Lilly, believed that they had developed 
effective “amyloid modulation” mostly through passive vaccinations or amyloid 
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immunotherapy (Salomone et al., 2012).  As part of the case study in Chapter 3 
we will discuss how Lilly overcame this challenge by thinking differently.   For 
now, let’s unpack leadership’s role in creating an innovative ecosystem that 
would set themselves up for long-term success in the AD marketplace. 
 
Leadership and Innovation 
 
A worldwide survey of top-level executives shows that over 70% of 
executives acknowledge that innovation is an important short-term growth driver; 
however, the same survey indicated that 65% of executives are disappointed in 
their companies’ ability to innovate despite investing in workshops, motivational 
speakers, and consultants.  These surveyed executives shared that processes 
slowed down the speed of innovation in their organizations while reporting that 
their staff seemed disengaged, dull, and subdued (Soken and Barnes, 2014).   
It has been implied that it isn’t enough for executives to have the right 
mentality regarding the need to innovate—leaders need to create a culture where 
employees feel like they are contributing to a common goal (Soken and Barnes, 
2014).  Leadership must have the correct mindset and put the right practices in 
place.  This involves having executives who are future oriented enough to trade 
off investments in maximizing a firm's present technology in order to create new 
generations of technology.  This also means that management must create an 
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environment that empowers people and encourages experimentations with new 
unproven ideas (Tellis, Prabhu, & Chandy, 2009). 
It isn’t enough to schedule workshops, motivational speakers, and 
consultants.  These processes, in many ways, are analogous to distributing a 
memo that reads, “Be more inventive!”  The key is to holistically develop an 
innovative culture that sets time apart for staff to work on pet projects, new ideas, 
or brainstorming activities (Quinn, 2010).  These notions will be unpacked later 
when we discuss leadership’s role in promoting an innovative workplace. 
Leaders often misrepresent themselves to their staff.  Staff might infer that 
their leadership is aloof, thus shattering any opportunity to build key relationships 
with staff.  Clarifying purpose, taking risks, measuring/rewarding innovation, and 
busting boundaries are all necessary qualities seen in leadership of organizations 
that excel with regards to innovative practices (Quinn, 1987). 
True leadership is a core ingredient to building an innovative culture.  
Instead of seeing one's role as a manager in charge of resourcing and 
controlling, a quality leader would recognize that an organization comprises 
unique human beings with varying skills and interests.  True leadership is able to 
engage people at a different level of interaction, build meaningful relationships, 
and establish a common set of goals and values (Soken and Barnes, 2014).   
 Executives may not understand the value of an innovative culture for 
countless reasons.  Perhaps they cannot see past “their finance-focused 
mindsets” (Fischer, 2011) or maybe they don’t see a need to risk revisiting a 
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process, product, or service that can be reconstructed into something better.  In 
many ways the ability to innovate starts with the leadership's prioritizing it over 
short-term gains.   
 So what role does leadership play in preserving or inventing an innovative 
spirit within their organization?  One might argue that quality leadership is the 
premier catalyst to launch an innovative culture within their own organization.  In 
his guide Becoming a Master Manager, Quinn shares his viewpoint on applicable 
management techniques and suggests reserving time for creative thinking and 
innovation (Quinn, 2010).  Quinn shares that leadership must help protect and 
reward the process.  These values must be ingrained in the organizational 
culture to demonstrate that strong, top-down leadership authorize, encourage, 
and support innovative activities throughout the organization (Fischer, 2011).   
  
Leadership’s Role in Promoting an Innovative Workplace 
 
 
Leadership also have the opportunities to develop right-sized policies to fit 
their organization’s needs.  Consider the reserved innovation policy at Google.  
Within Google’s corporate headquarters it is expected that 20% of an employee’s 
time would be dedicated to working on pet projects, exploring new opportunities, 
or cross-pollinating ideas with different groups.  For one day a week, each 
Google employee dives into focused free-thinking with leadership’s expectation 
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that it is ultimately contributes to a “change engine” (Gersch, 2013).  This policy, 
albeit counter-intuitive to many, is designed to help improve employee morale 
while supporting Google’s core values to create innovative products, tools, and 
experiences.  
This notion isn’t entirely unique to Google.  Consider W.L. Gore, a 
fluoropolymer manufacturing company, who also protected 10% of an 
employee’s time to work on projects that would otherwise be off budget and/or 
out of scope (Hamel, 2007).  W.L. Gore also exhibited a distinctive management 
practice that focused on eliminating unnecessary hierarchy and reinforcing the 
notion that anyone can innovate when given the proper opportunities (Hamel, 
2007).   
  Other examples include IDEO and their “set designer” role, who enriches 
their organization by maximizing space to promote better and more organic 
communication among their teams (Kelly & Littman, 2008), or the Virgin Group, 
who decided that their corporate policy with respect to vacation schedules should 
be non-existent (Branson, 2015).  In other words, Virgin employees are trusted 
by their management to work when they need to, vacation when they are able, 
and not worry about punching the clock.  This policy—or non-policy—
demonstrates the trust that Virgin leadership has in their staff.   
 Fostering an innovative culture starts with leadership.  Leadership, in 
many ways, promotes and supports a corporate culture that permeates an 
innovative spirit in all facets of the working model.  If leadership understands the 
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value of innovation, it is important to instill these values whenever possible.  
Recognize that innovation is like a fire—it has to be fed, poked, and prodded 
occasionally to ensure it’s still burning hot.  Communicating the desire to create 
early and often remains an urgent need.  This focus on fostering an innovative 
culture represented one of Avid’s core competencies.   
 Avid’s long-term President could effectively feed, poke, and prod his drug 
development team by preaching the need to be “paranoid” that somebody else 
will catch up and develop a competitive product better, faster, and cheaper.ii  At 
Avid remaining “paranoid” becomes a core competency in many ways.  Among 
other groups in the organization, project management were challenged by this 
notion to find ways to cut timelines without cutting corners and clinical developers 
to seek strategic partnerships and examine new opportunities.  Scientists were 
encouraged to cross-pollinate with each other and to seek outside expertise.  
Even senior management was challenged to find ways to set the company up for 
short and long term success. 
 On a final point, leadership also has the opportunity to encourage risk 
taking.  Innovation is inherently risky and getting the most from a collection of 
innovation enterprises is more about managing risk than eliminating it (de Jong, 
Marston, Roth, & van Biljon, 2013).  Business magnate Elon Musk helped 
illustrate the value of risk taking and failure by saying “failure is an option here [at 
Tesla Motors].  If things are not failing, you are not innovating enough” (D’Onfro, 
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2013).  Adding to Mr. Musk’s thoughts, early 20th-century architect Daniel 
Burnham famously shares: 
“Make no little plans; they have no magic to stir men's blood and 
probably themselves will not be realized. Make big plans; aim high 
in hope and work, remembering that a noble, logical diagram once 
recorded will not die, but long after we are gone be a living thing, 
asserting itself with ever-growing insistence. Remember that our 
sons and our grandsons are going to do things that would stagger 
us. Let your watchword be order and your beacon beauty” (Daniel 
Burnham, 1907)  
Translation: playing it safe won’t yield tremendous results and risks are a 
necessary evil.  Out-of-the-box thinking ought to be encouraged.  Ideologies such 
as “this is how we’ve always done it here,” hold no water in a cutting edge 
organization.   
 
The Value of a Single Case 
 
Up until now we have determined what innovation is and why it is a 
desired asset in important in drug development and AD research.  We have also 
spent time discussing leadership’s role in the process.  At this juncture we need 
to develop an understanding of the value of case study research, as this will be 
the primary delivery of the documented learnings in Chapter 3. 
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The essence of case study research is to capture the complexity of a 
single case, namely a case that holds a special interest to the audience.  A case 
study itself is the “study of the particularity and complexity of a single case” 
(Stake, 1995) and allows the researcher to investigate activity under the nuanced 
circumstances.  There is power in studying a single-case regardless of our ability 
to replicate the same design or circumstance.  We are interested in the 
uniqueness of each study, and yet we are drawn to understanding commonality 
so we might learn from others (Stake, 1995) 
While multiple reporting formats exist for case studies, this capstone will 
adopt the classic linear-analytic single-case study approach (Yin, 2013).  In the 
realm of AD research a case could easily be written about an individual, a 
project, a drug, or a company; however, this case study will dive into the 
relationships between two very different companies with respect to innovation.  
Over the course of the past six years I have had opportunities to observe both 
Lilly and Avid from a singular employee/contractor lens, yet this capstone offers 
me the unique opportunity to evaluate both organizations—pre- and post-
acquisition—through an Organization Dynamics (OD) lens.   
 
 
  
34 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
Throughout Chapter 3 we will attempt to understand two drastically 
different companies that share a similar vision.  Lilly, a market leader, has an 
impressive history and track record of developing high-end products while still 
identifying themselves as a family company (Madison, 1989).  Avid, a “pull 
yourself up by your own bootstrap” company, had a comparatively short 
presence in the marketplace; however, Avid had a valued asset that could 
reshape AD development.  How could this marriage work?  It might make sense 
to start at the beginning of amyloid tracers and a small start-up company in 
Philadelphia.  
 
Avid: From the Lab to Acquisition Candidate 
 
 
Prior to any involvement with potential pharmaceutical suitors arriving in 
2009 and 2010, Avid, a spin-off of the research laboratories at the University of 
Pennsylvania, had recognized the clinical utility of PiB and began adapting the 
manufacturing techniques with the goal of producing an amyloid biomarker that 
could be used on a large scale (Klunk et al, 2004).   Starting in the year they 
were founded, 2005, Avid had re-formulated the tracer using fludeoxyglucose 
(herein 18F), a common isotope used for PET imaging, to help increase the half-
35 
 
life of the newfound tracer (Jacobson & Chen, 2010).   This was, in essence, a 
Schumpeterian innovation.  In 2009 researchers (led by Avid) concluded that: 
“Treatments are being developed for Alzheimer's disease that are 
designed to prevent the accumulation of cerebral plaques and 
tangles or to disaggregate them once they are present. A 
noninvasive method of determining the regional cerebral patterns of 
these lesions would not only assist in early diagnosis of Alzheimer's 
disease but also facilitate monitoring of the efficacy of such 
treatments” (Choi, 2009). 
 
Avid had recognized that by utilizing a biomarker it could determine the 
presence or absence of amyloid.  Moreover, at the start of the organization Avid 
also believed that measuring amyloid burden longitudinally could offer 
researchers a tool to measure the change in burden over time.   
This seemingly simple concept, when paired with cutting edge imaging 
and manufacturing technology, showed the potential of revolutionizing the 
methods used in modern AD research.  Much as with any other drug product, 
Avid needed to test its biomarker—clinically titled 18F-AV45—before gaining the 
necessary approvals to offer the product commercially.  The process of 
conducting clinical studies and providing the necessary safety and efficacy 
evidence to regulators tends to be a lengthy process while costing several 
millions of dollars.   
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Following the aforementioned publication of the pre-clinical evidence 
(Choi, 2009), pharmaceutical industry leaders began pursuing Avid as a clinical 
partner with the intention of including amyloid imaging in their inclusion and 
exclusion criteria within their clinical drug development processes.   
 
How Had Pre-Acquisition Avid Been Innovative? 
 
 
From a Schumpeterian perspective Avid demonstrated a keen ability to 
leverage existing technology and create a new product to serve an existing need.  
This, of course, was not enough.  As we defined innovation in Chapter 2, Avid’s 
leadership needed to find a way to “implement these new ideas and processes 
with the intent to drive economic growth in the marketplace” (Kanter, 1984; Kline 
and Rosenberg, 1986; Schumpeter, 1912; Schumpeter, 1934).  The major 
challenges that Avid was faced with were 1.) capital investment and 2.) defining 
the regulations.  Each of these unique challenges required an innovative 
approach, especially considering radiopharmaceuticals were relatively unknown 
venture.  Let’s review examples of how Avid was able to overcome these 
obstacles on their road to success. 
 
Capital Investment 
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Much like other start-up organizations, Avid needed a cash infusion to 
properly scale their business.  At the time Dr. Daniel Skovronsky, the Scientific 
Director of High Throughput Screening and Drug Discovery at the Center for 
Neurodegenerative Disease Research at the University of Pennsylvania, had 
recognized the potential benefit of amyloid imaging in AD research and saw a 
unique opportunity to launch into the marketplace.  Dr. Skovronsky also 
recognized that an academic lab was a great incubator for this research but 
could become rate limiting when trying to scale.iii  
A common path taken by young entrepreneurs in the life sciences industry 
is to seek venture capitalist investment, but there are trade-offs to consider.  By 
accepting a cash infusion to rent buildings, buy equipment, hire staff, and pay for 
regulatory fees, Dr. Skovronsky knew he would need to relinquish some level of 
control.iv  After all, venture capitalists will look to squeeze every cent out of a 
business transaction.  So what were the alternatives? 
Instead of seeking venture capitalist funds, Dr. Skovronsky, while still 
employed at the University of Pennsylvania, was determined to finance his 
newfound business while maintaining maximum control.  He took two 
approaches: negotiate an exclusive licensing agreement with the University and 
apply for lucrative NIH funding.   
First, Dr. Skovronsky had recognized that the University had historically 
been a fertile breeding ground for breakthrough technologies and that they had 
used this to their advantage (Farrell, 2008).  Simply put, the University of 
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Pennsylvania (among many esteemed universities) has a found a way to turn 
research into revenue.  He was able to leverage key relationships internally to 
negotiate an exclusive license agreement with the school that would enable him 
to use the amyloid biomarker technologies.  While the specific terms remain 
confidential, Dr. Skovronsky was given exclusive access to the technology and a 
small start-up “kicker” with the understanding that the University of Pennsylvania 
would have the rights to a percentage of the commercial sales in perpetuity.   
Second, the newly formed Avid had applied for NIH funding to continue to 
development of their research.  To Avid’s surprise they were rewarded with two 
NIH funds to help continue their unique research.  Once the funds were secured, 
Avid was able to officially start its fully independent venture. 
In 2008 Avid had successful developed AV1, an amyloid tracer that 
demonstrated good imaging characteristics (contrast, retention, wash-out, etc.) 
and proved to be viable for research purposes.  Avid also knew that they had 
other compounds, namely AV45, in their pipeline that might prove to have better 
imaging characteristics and could be more easily scaled from a manufacturing 
perspective. Avid decided to bet on itself.  They opted to sell AV1 to Bayer AG, a 
German-based pharmaceutical organization that believed AV1 would 
complement their imaging portfolio.  By selling to Bayer they became cash flush 
and reinvested in their own development pipeline.  This allowed Avid to hire 
subject matter expert consultants to help develop its next big thing, AV45.  This 
was clearly a risk since Bayer was primed to be “first in class,” a notion that 
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suggests greater-than-fair market share on average (Cha & Yu, 2008).  Yet, Avid 
had positioned itself to succeed by re-writing the path to a New Drug Application 
(herein NDA).   
 
Defining the Regulations 
 
 
 The problem Avid faced was that radiopharmaceuticals, especially in AD, 
barely had documented regulations.  Most radiotracers had been designed for 
cancer imaging and didn’t necessarily follow the same regulatory approval 
processes.  Instead of seeing this as a problem, Avid saw this as a solution.  As 
Dennis Gabor once said, “the best way to predict the future is to invent it” (Gabor, 
1968).   
 Avid saw itself in an advantageous circumstance.  While Bayer might have 
a drug in Phase II testing, Avid recognized that Big Pharma had big processes 
that required big time investments.  Avid flipped the script and saw an opportunity 
to invent the new process for developing a radiopharmaceutical.  Instead of 
taking a traditional method of completing studies phase-by-phase (refer to Figure 
4: Traditional Clinical Trial Phases), they effectively accelerated their whole 
program by conducting several studies in parallel, a notion that was innovative 
for biomarker research (refer to Figure 5: Accelerated Clinical Trial Phases).   
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Figure 4: Traditional Clinical Trial Phases 
 
 
 
During the development of AV45, Avid included both healthy controls and 
AD subjects in the Phase I process.  This allowed the medical team to 
understand how the drug would work in the desired population months—or 
maybe years—earlier than in a traditional Phase I study design.  They also 
blended Phases II and III together to create a hybrid Phase II/III that allowed 
them to start their Phase III studies faster. 
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Figure 5: Accelerated Clinical Trial Phases 
 
 
 
Of course this was not planned in a box.  Avid, using the funds from the 
Bayer sale, was able to hire regulatory experts to help influence the FDA and 
other regulators to approve their drug development planv.  As fate would have it, 
Avid was able to finish its NDA-enabling Phase III study in 2008, a full two years 
faster than Bayer was able to complete their Phase III study in 2010. Although 
the costs cannot be made available in this text, it is clear that Avid would have 
exclusive access to the market with a solid two-year head start.    
 
Amyloid Imaging and Its Impact in the Industry 
 
 
The discovery of AV45 was recognized as a standard when the NIH and 
NIA confirmed that amyloid imaging was a useful diagnostic tool when used 
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appropriately (McKhann et al, 2011).  Industry leaders started seeing the 
potential of AV45 as a means of tracking the efficacy of amyloid modulators (i.e. 
comparing baseline and follow-up imaging to determine a change in amyloid 
burden) and optimizing their protocol selection criteria.  Leaders also 
acknowledged that AV45 could be used as a means of determining which 
patients would respond to therapy in large, expensive Phase III studies.  AV45 
could also be used to “kill” ineffective therapies being tested in Phase I and 
Phase II trials years before the Phase III studies are even conceptualized.  
Considering the cost to develop a new drug has exploded to $1.7B – $5B (of 
which nearly 60% is done in the clinical phase—see Figure 6) the inclusion of 
amyloid imaging helped identify therapeutics that were worth the investment 
(Mullin, 2014, Herper, 2013). 
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Figure 6: The Cost of Developing a New Drug 
 
 
By the beginning of 2010 the development of neuroimaging biomarkers 
had begun to change the landscape for how clinical trials would be conducted 
and ultimately (hopefully) how new AD medicines are brought to market 
(Risacher & Saykin, 2013).  Several pharmaceutical organizations recognized 
that innovative Aβ biomarkers were primed to change the way drugs progress 
through their development lifecycle (Castellani and Perry, 2012; Wolfe, 2012).  
Big Pharma companies like Pfizer Inc (Pfizer), Merck & Co (Merck), and Lilly had 
begun to “kick the tires” of Avid’s product.  As a result they worked with Avid to 
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include AV45 in their trials.  For these trials AV45 was used as an exploratory 
endpoint, which suggested that the pharmaceutical company’s’ protocols would 
use AV45 in a subset of subjects enrolled in their study to determine if the tracer 
was a sufficient surrogate biomarker to help determine efficacy.   
 Avid leadership started to take notice of these trends, and although their 
intention was to remain independent they also saw how a strategic partnership 
could benefit Avid, a partnering company, patients, treating physicians, and AD 
advocates alike.   
 
Lilly: A Recent History 
  
 
For just shy of 140 years Lilly has cemented themselves as an industry 
leader in several therapeutic areas.  While many drug historians might point to 
Lilly’s proud history of developing diabetic and insulin products, the Big Pharma 
organization boasts a wide array of products that includes cardiovascular, 
depression, oncology, osteoporosis, ED, and pain.  As surprising as it might be 
Lilly has established themselves as a leader in AD research and development for 
the past thirty years (Madison, 1989).   
Over the past ten years Lilly had begun funneling more research and 
development funding into their AD franchises.  They believed they had some 
game-changing products in their pipeline, including a late phase product called 
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semagacestat and an early phase product referred to as solanezumab, 
nicknames Sema and Sola, respectively. 
By 2008 Lilly, among other pharmaceutical organizations, had started a 
professional relationship with Avid.  They were using AV45 in a subset of 
subjects in their latest Sema and Sola Phase III protocols.  The theory was to 
compare a subject’s earliest AV45 scan with a future AV45 scan to see if Sema 
and/or Sola could “wash-out” the amyloid plaques.  In other words, AV45 wasn’t 
used to its fullest extent as a selection criteria tool, it was only used to measure 
change.   
The Phase III Sema study kicked off in September 2008 and by mid-2010 
Lilly would receive disappointing results from a mid-study interim analysis that 
showed Sema had performed worse than placebo (Karran, Mercken, & De 
Strooper, 2011).  The Phase III Sola studies would experience a similar fate in 
August 2010 when an early data read out suggested Sola did not met their 
primary endpoints (Kambhampthy & Smith-Parker, 2012).  This was a crushing 
blow for a company that needed a win and was primed to be first in class.  Then 
again, drug development is not for the faint of heart (Mochly-Rosen & Grimes, 
2014).   
During a post-mortem Lilly had diligently combed through their data to 
help see where mistakes were made.  As scientific experts Lilly began asking 
themselves difficult questions.  Was the science erroneous?  Were there 
problems with the delivery method?  As they poured over the data they 
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recognized that a small element of the data had some promise.  Well after the 
studies were deemed to be cancelled, Lilly assessed each of the subjects that 
had been imaged with AV45 at the beginning of the study, rough ~200 in total.  
What they saw changed the course of their research.   
Of the ~200 subjects that were imaged with AV45, only 70% actually had 
the pockets of accumulated amyloid plaque in their brains.  The remaining 30% 
had no evidence of amyloid.  Further analyses concluded that the 70% of 
subjects that actually had AD pathology were actually responding to treatment, a 
treatment that was specifically designed to wash out amyloid.  Lilly immediately 
began drawing up a new protocol with the hopes of proving that Sola has been 
effective.  Their next Sola Phase III protocol would include amyloid imaging as 
selection criteria, a study that would be the first of its kind. 
 
The Acquisition 
 
 
By mid-2010, Avid was nearing the completion of their pivotal Phase III 
study that would enable their New Drug Application (NDA) with the FDA.  
Coincidently the positive results from Avid’s study were first published on August 
27th, 2010, just ten days after Lilly discovered the fate of Sema.  The results from 
Avid’s study quickly became news in the AD research community and Avid was 
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suddenly an acquisition target.  Among the most prominent were Merck, Pfizer, 
and Lilly. 
Fortunately for Avid it was independent and was able to select the best 
strategic partner based on portfolio, relationship, and position in the market.  All 
companies spent several weeks on-site at Avid combing through financial 
records, INDs, clinical files, Trial Master Files (TMFs), and SOPs to access 
value, risk, and potential.  Avid also had its fair share of demands.  They wanted 
to keep their team in tact in Philadelphia, they wanted to remain independent and 
follow their SOPs, and they wanted a partnership, not a traditional acquisition. 
In the end, Avid chose not to sell to companies in the Philadelphia region, 
such as Merck.  Instead Avid agreed to terms with Lilly, a Midwest-based 
organization located in Indianapolis, Indiana that sold Dr. Skovronsky and other 
on the “family feel” and the willingness to keep Avid at an arm’s distance.  The 
driver for the decision, in large part, was Lilly’s willingness to acquire Avid and 
keep it independent.  On November 8, 2010, prior to Avid's receiving FDA 
approval for AV45, Lilly acquired Avid for $800M to help bolster its AD diagnostic 
portfolio (Carroll, 2010). 
 
The Challenge: Remaining Innovative Post-Acquisition 
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At the time of the acquisition Lilly and Avid were companies on very 
different ends of a cultural spectrum—refer to Table 2: Avid and Lilly Corporate 
Comparison.  At the beginning of the acquisition there was some level of anxiety 
among Avid employees primarily because expectations were unclear.  Most 
hadn’t been involved in an acquisition before and were unsure what the next 
steps would be.  Leadership had given some assurances about their jobs and 
had encouraged them to continue to focus on the work at hand as if “nothing has 
happened.” 
 
Table 2: Avid and Lilly: Corporate Comparison 
 Avid Lilly 
Location Philadelphia PA Indianapolis IN 
Size 75 employees, all domestic 41,000 employees 55 
countries 
Ownership Private Publicly Held (NYSE) 
Products Amyvid® Numerous (30+ currently) 
Culture Young, vibrant, 
independent, unrestricted 
Collaborative, process-
focused, family oriented 
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 Avid Lilly 
Employee 
Experiences 
Average employment last 
3-4 years 
Average employee projects to 
retire from Lilly after 23.5 
years of service 
Issues Facing the 
Organization 
Developing new 
compounds and support 
therapeutic trials 
Drug pricing and gaining 2-3 
drug approvals per year 
 
 
 Over time Avid began to see Lilly adding processes where processes 
hadn’t existed before.  New systems were implemented and training sessions 
were scheduled.  Quality groups were on site for weeks to help establish more 
robust guidelines to help protect against audits.  Lilly was clearly trying to protect 
their asset by ensuring Avid was compliant and functioning under Lilly standards; 
however, these processes, systems, and guidance were threatening to hamper 
Avid's best quality: the ability to innovative under an independent setting.  What 
was Avid able to do to help protect its innovative qualities while promoting the 
same qualities throughout Lilly? 
 
Avid and Lilly’s Organizational Development Challenge 
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By 2012 the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had 
approved Amyvid®, the brand name associated with AV45, as the first amyloid 
imaging tracer available on a commercial scale (Garber, 2012).  While Amyvid® 
was groundbreaking, the community realized that amyloid burden is not 
consistently associated with disease severity or duration, only with the existence 
of amyloid plaques.  In fact, it is a patient’s tau protein burden that generally 
correlates with symptom severity and progression (Devous et al 2014).   
Following the acquisition, new research has suggested that the presence 
of Aβ was important to determine disease but the rate of accumulating tau 
proteins was key to understanding the overall progression of the memory-robbing 
disease.  Researchers have recently illustrated this by saying “Aβ and tau serve 
as respective triggers and bullets for AD pathogenesis” (Nisbet et al, 2015).  In 
lay terms, Amyvid® remained an important tool for determining AD pathology but 
imaging tau proteins would be a more sensitive measurement of disease 
progression.  Amyloid imaging would help detect the presence of disease at 
earlier stages but tau protein imaging would be more sensitive in determining 
progression (or lack thereof) longitudinally.  This led Avid and Lilly to pursue 
opportunities to develop a tau protein biomarker to complement Amyvid® and by 
mid-2013, Lilly and Avid made two concurrent changes.   
First, Lilly appointed Dr. Skovronsky as their Senior Vice President of 
Product & Clinical Development within their Tailored Therapeutics division.  In 
this role, Dr. Skovronsky was asked to redesign processes to make Lilly more 
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efficient while ensuring high-throughput.  While still serving on Avid’s Board of 
Directors, he would be tasked with driving change in therapeutic areas beyond 
AD.  Lilly had recognized his ability to drive organizational excellence on a 
smaller model and wanted to leverage this experience to influence leadership 
within Lilly. 
The second change was more concrete.  In an effort to shore up its lead in 
AD biomarkers and diagnostics, Lilly acquired an imaging agent from Siemens 
(Steenhuysen, 2013).  This agent was specifically designed to image a patient’s 
tau protein in vivo, using a technology similar to that of Amyvid®.  Lilly and Avid 
leaders collaborated on the decision to acquire the new imaging agent and 
agreed that Avid would be tasked with developing the imaging agent.  Following 
the acquisition, Avid retooled the manufacturing process and labeled its new 
asset 18F-AV1451 (herein AV1451. 
There is, however, a critical difference in the environment where Avid had 
developed Amyvid® versus that in which AV1451 would be developed.  In 2010, 
when Avid was acquired by Lilly to “complement the drug maker’s development 
of new treatments for Alzheimer’s disease” (Loftus, 2010), Avid had completed 
most of their Phase I, II, and III development work; however, AV1451 would start 
in Phase I and would be developed alongside Lilly.   
Avid’s leadership and staff had experienced the need to protect their 
innovative culture following their acquisition.  Experiences from the early stages 
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of the acquisition demonstrated the importance of identifying barriers, illustrating 
a need for balance, and ultimately demonstrating value through reciprocity.   
Now that it was tasked with developing a new imaging tracer with Lilly, 
Avid was primed to enter a new phase of its corporate relationship.   
How might this change with the acquisition of a new asset?  Could they 
reuse the same strategy to exemplify the independence suggested in their 
“wholly owned subsidiary of Eli Lilly & Co” title?  Or would Avid need to find new 
approaches to protecting its innovative culture? 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
As of the beginning of 2016 AV1451 has been studied in Phase I and 
Phase II clinical studies and has recently moved into recruiting their Phase III 
studies (Devous et al, 2015).  The intention had been for Avid to independently 
develop a tracer that would be sensitive to imaging tau proteins to help the 
medical community follow tau accumulation longitudinally to better determine 
which therapeutics were having the highest effect on a patient’s “tauopathy” 
(James, 2015).  The operative words in the preceding sentence were 
“independently develop.“  This would quickly change. 
Throughout the early development of AV1451 Avid had started seeing 
some positive data that caught the attention of Lilly’s AD Platform team.  As a 
result Lilly and Avid’s leadership decided to co-develop AV1451 within Lilly‘s AD 
theraeputics studies.  In lay terms, Lilly began adding AV1451 imaging into 
studies like Sola.  In theory Sola would benefit from adding AV1451 by 
demonstrating the slowing or reduction of tau protein burden over time.  
Additionally, AV1451 would benefit from Sola since the Sola trials were 
expansive and offered access to new patients who could benefit from tau protein 
imaging.   
This shift proved to be another means of innovating AD medicines.  In this 
case Lilly had begun adding AV1451 into its therapeutic studies.  This 
methodology—the idea of using two experimental drugs simultaneously—would 
require multiple, study-specific teams at Lilly to work closely with Avid.   
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The timing of these events coincided with my progression through the 
MSOD program.  Throughout the course of this co-development, I had the unique 
opportunity to proactively apply my MSOD education to better understand the 
interactions between the two companies.  In short, Avid had become my 
laboratory that provided rich, real-world learning experiences.   
This chapter is dedicated to understanding Avid‘s post-acquisition 
organizational behaviors.  First, to better understand how innovation was 
protected at Avid, we will spend time reviewing methodologies that did and did 
not work.  Second, we will look through a number of complementary 
organizational dynamics lenses to better understand the post-acquisition 
interactions between Avid and Lilly.  The complementary organizational 
dynamics lenses will be presented in a vignette-like arrangement.  The goal by 
the end of this Chapter is to examine the effects each organization had on each 
other while providing a roadmap for sustaining innovation in an evolving 
workplace.   
 
How Innovation Was Protected at Avid – Introduction 
 
  
From the very start of the co-development it was clear Avid wouldn’t carry 
on with “business as usual.”  There was clearly a need to connect systems and 
allow Lilly access to Avid’s intellectual property.  While these elements were 
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essential to Lilly, Avid was also trying to protect its culture.  Avid recognized that 
successful innovation is not created through good fortune and magic—it is a 
product of a properly aligned strategy, a supportive culture, talent, an 
understanding leadership core, and risk-taking (Soken and Barnes, 2014).   
A balance must be maintained: bureaucracy must be held in check and 
the rush to develop drug for the marketplace should not undermine the cross-
functional collaboration, continuous learning cycles, and clear decision pathways 
that help enable innovation (de Jong, Marston, Roth, & van Biljon, 2013) 
This was an opportunity for Avid to reassess their role and pivot.  At 
various stages following the acquisition, Avid attempted to protect its innovative 
culture by 1.) identifying the real or perceived barriers of innovation, 2.) 
illustrating a need for balance, and 3.) demonstrating value through reciprocity. 
 
Identifying the Real or Perceived Barriers of Innovation 
 
 Before Avid could learn to protect its innovative culture they first needed to 
understand what threatened it.  Immediately following the acquisition it was clear 
that Lilly’s well-defined structure—processes, SOPs, and systems—could hinder 
Avid’s approach; however, the structure itself wasn’t necessarily designed to 
stifle innovation or creativity.  For large companies like Lilly, the structure was 
needed to organize and mobilize large team in a consistent, standardized way 
(Soken and Barnes, 2014).   
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The problem that many large companies face regarding agility occurs 
when structure implicitly or explicitly reinforces the status quo (Soken and 
Barnes, 2014).  In other words, some employees—mostly associate level—might 
have felt encouraged to stay within the defined boundaries—if not, they could 
expect to be realigned with the status quo or pushed out completely (Soken and 
Barnes, 2014).   
 This process-driven structure lends itself to a demonstrated lack of 
flexibility and openness to new opportunities.  At Lilly, it is typically expected to 
have a complete analysis rife with statistics, pricing models, task force charters 
and timelines before alternatives would be considered.  Alternatively smaller, 
innovative organizations could thrive in the “now.”vi  A common metaphor used 
with Avid’s office space was “flying a plane while building it,” a notion that 
demonstrates their willingness to try new, maybe risky, opportunities without 
suffering from “analysis paralysis.” 
 From a marketplace perspective Avid prides themselves on making the 
best decisions with the end customer in mind.  Avid employees are encouraged 
to think “is this right for the customer?” before thinking “is this right for the 
company?” or “is this best for my department?”  (Gault, 1994)   While Lilly makes 
every effort to manufacture high-end drugs with the consumer in mind, the 
relative operative structure is the complete opposite of an organization in touch 
with the customer.  Staff are inclined to think “is this best for my department?” 
before considering “is this right for the company?”  (Gault, 1994)    
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For Avid, understanding the barriers of innovation was both an initial and 
iterative process.  It was also apparent that “big companies do not easily reinvent 
themselves as leading innovators as they have too many fixed routines and 
cultural factors can get in the way” (de Jong, Marston, Roth, & van Biljon, 2013).   
Lilly was modeled to be a scalable, global organization.  In order to scale, 
clearly defined processes and standards needed to be implemented.  Avid didn’t 
require the same rigorous processes to be impactful.  From a leadership 
perspective, however, Lilly’s senior management proved to be open to input and 
suggestions from Avid’s core teams.  On several occasions Avid’s perspectives 
were considered and ultimately used to change part of Lilly’s processes.  This 
became an interesting learning experience.  While Avid initially perceived Lilly to 
be a barrier to its own success, it was becoming clearer that Avid was considered 
a partner who could influence Lilly. 
The barriers were often perceived barriers.  Avid’s staff had managed to 
tell themselves a story about Lilly that was exaggerated.  Lilly had established 
themselves as a learning company and proved willing to listen and apply change 
when it was appropriate.  From Avid’s middle-management’s perspective, this 
was a game-changer and presented opportunities to strike a balance in drug 
development practices.  Avid had the opportunity to co-exist but would need to 
find ways to bend-and-not-break. 
 
Illustrating a Need for Balance 
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A proper balance needs to be maintained in order to fully realize the 
benefits of a partnership (de Jong, Marston, Roth, & van Biljon, 2013).  The 
bureaucratic practices—SOPs, Best Practices, Clinical Planning Documents—
that were being pushed onto Avid from Lilly had value but had to be kept in 
check, otherwise the processes could adversely impact Avid’s historically 
successful methodologies.  Simultaneously Avid needed to understand that it had 
a new stakeholder to consider and rushing through projects might potentially 
undermine the “cross-functional collaboration, continuous learning cycles, and 
clear decision pathways that help enable innovation” (de Jong, Marston, Roth, & 
van Biljon, 2013). 
In my experience working across both organizations, there was one 
exemplary instance that illustrated a time when it was appropriate to seek a 
balanced approach that would satisfy both groups.  At the point of acquisition 
Lilly’s Quality Management Team spent time at Avid to review work instructions, 
SOPs, and guidelines to get a better sense for the processes that were employed 
at Avid.  The initial internal audit report was returned several weeks later and 
recommended a total overhaul of processes at Avid.  Avid’s Quality Assurance 
Team, consisting of only two employees, was faced with the daunting task to 
establish new processes that they didn’t fully understand.  Lilly had 
recommended various systems and tools that could be made available to help 
organize Avid and theoretically make it more compliant with Lilly standards. 
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The problem, as Avid saw it, was that new processes would suffocate its 
ability to produce in the same time frame that they had produced in the past.  
Avid’s Quality Assurance Team added that increased processes would set Avid 
up for failure.  From their perspective increased processes could result in more 
errors because teams might not realize what rules they were breaking.  
By seeking balance between the leadership in both organizations, the end 
result was “right-sizing” Avid’s procedures to align with the spirit of the Lilly 
standards while giving Avid the flexibility to work within the confines of the 
procedures.  This was managed by leveraging the political network from both 
sides of the organization.  In the aforementioned SOP example, Avid’s senior 
management was able to effectively negotiate with Lilly’s Operations team to 
explain the need to “right-size” SOPs to fit Avid’s culture.  These negotiations 
ultimately led to balancing Lilly’s expectations with Avid’s capabilities.   
Relationship development and management became a critical part of Lilly 
and Avid’s mutual success (Johanson & Vahlne, 2003).  By demonstrating 
mutual respect and demonstrating a willingness to learn from each other, Lilly 
was able to see how processes could hinder Avid.  Meanwhile, Avid understood 
the importance of satisfying a newfound stakeholder as part of a post-acquisition 
integration process (Birkinshaw, et al, 2000), thus leading us to concept of 
reciprocity.   
 
Demonstrating Value Through Reciprocity 
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As has been explained above, Lilly acquired Avid to tap into its deep 
domain knowledge and to leverage their existing pipeline and manufacturing 
network to support Lilly’s ongoing and future clinical trials.  This is the value that 
Avid was able to bring to the table.  Yet, at the beginning of the relationship Avid 
sensed its expertise was being marginalized by a Lilly team that was accustomed 
to following their own processes.   
Avid felt that it had something to offer Lilly as they had their “finger on the 
pulse” of a budding imaging biomarker sub-industry.  From Avid’s perspective 
Lilly could come across as bureaucratic and seemingly comfortable conducting 
research using their tried-and-true methods.  While Lilly was process driven, Avid 
perceived that Lilly was periodically preoccupied with their own view of the world 
(Gault, 1994).  Who is to say that Avid is right and Lilly is wrong?  Herein lies a 
linchpin to maximizing post-acquisition organization success—reciprocity (Oliver, 
1990).   
Reciprocity emphasizes the need for cooperation and collaboration over 
domination, power, and control (Oliver, 1990).  By demonstrating a willingness to 
adopt a new perspective and evaluate a different paradigm through a new lens, 
collaborating organizations can theoretically “see the whole elephant” (Saxe, et 
al, 1963). 
While Avid had a knack for innovating and accelerating its drug 
development, they still needed support with scaling their network, standardizing 
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processes, and developing a more appropriate infrastructure to support their 
forecasted clinical and commercial demand.  This is where Lilly thrived.  
Alternatively parts of Lilly found themselves working by procedures and not 
necessarily thinking outside the box for new approaches.  This is where Avid 
thrived. 
The Lilly “family”vii appreciates the notion of reciprocity.  Their teams 
preferred transparency and a sense that they didn’t need to guess what their 
teammates were working on.  Lilly employees, while more machine-like (Morgan, 
2006) in approach, eventually demonstrated a willingness to teach their process 
while learning from the expertise of others (Morgan, 2006).  In other words, they 
didn’t intentionally pose a threat to Avid’s innovation—they were merely trying to 
learn and scale.   
Avid didn’t need to follow Lilly’s “cultural rules“ but to demonstrate a 
certain level of respect for their rules.  Lilly possessed a rich history and their 
employees genuinely believed that they were standing on the shoulders of 
giants.  While Avid and Lilly’s work ethic, history, culture, and ambitions are 
different, both organizations believe they are doing it the right way. 
Making a concerted effort to understand each other’s strengths and 
weaknesses helped provide various strategic options for managing innovation 
and productivity; however, this effort needed to be balanced, honest, and 
actionable.  Reciprocity can be a primary catalyst to tap into a wide range of 
collaborative relationships with the intention to access knowledge, skills, and 
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resources that cannot be produced successfully alone (Powell, 1998).  The key 
challenge in pharma (and other innovation-intensive fields) is to develop 
organizational routines for learning that are robust, flexible, and durable (Powell, 
1998). 
 
How Innovation was Protected at Avid - Conclusion 
 
 Through the use of identifying real or perceived barriers, finding balance, 
and demonstrating reciprocity, Avid was able to change their perspective.  Avid 
found that the best way to protect its innovativeness was to demonstrate their 
successes and overall impact to a learning company.  Fortunately, Lilly proved to 
be a learning company that wanted to be flexible with Avid’s core competencies.  
Lilly saw the overall benefit and opted to integrate Avid’s best practices if doing 
so made both companies more dynamic.   
 There were several organizational dynamics factors that were used 
throughout this process: developing and leveraging political network, and “seeing 
the whole elephant;“ however, there are many other examples for how my 
Organizational Dynamics education helped me understand the the post-
acquisition interactions between Avid and Lilly.     
 
Evaluating Post-Acquisition Life Through Complementary Organizational 
Dynamics Lenses 
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The aforementioned section focused on how Avid protected its innovative 
culture by identifying barriers, finding balance, and the value of reciprocity; 
however, there are other key organizational dynamic principles that help us 
understand the post-acquisition interactions between Avid and Lilly.  Concepts 
such as transition and change management, storytelling, organizational lenses, 
evolution, revolution, episodic change, organizational metaphors, and leadership 
all played a pivotal role in the pre-to-post-acquisition phases.  While many of 
these principles or tools were modestly applied during this process, they provided 
rich learning experiences that we can learn from.  In the following section I will 
unpack these concepts from my personal experiences and review these against 
Avid’s drug development experiences in a post-acquisition world. 
 
Transition and Change Management 
 
Despite Avid's staff's being supportive of the acquisition, there were still 
concerns about their jobs and how an acquisition could change their career 
trajectories.  Would the Philadelphia office close?  What jobs were now 
expendable since Lilly has a robust pool of resource?  Should we start looking for 
housing in Indianapolis? 
On top of these concerns Avid was going through growing pains of its own 
and it was proving difficult to motivate a staff to perform at a high level.  In the 
case of Avid, its leadership was faced with the challenge of managing a team 
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during an elongated Neutral Zone, a term the refers to a stage where people 
affected by change are confused, uncertain, or impatient (Bridges, 2003).   
During this elongated Neutral Zone period (Bridges, 2003), Lilly had begun 
implementing some new processes to align Avid with their model of running 
projects.  At that point several legacy employees dug their heels into the ground 
and stuck with the process that they felt comfortable using.  While it never 
appeared obvious that Avid team members were maliciously acting out, Avid and 
Lilly’s leadership missed an opportunity to acknowledge the legacy employees’ 
loss openly (Bridges, 2003).  They had a chance to sympathize with their various 
changes and offer some praise for their efforts with adopting new processes 
(Bridges, 2003). 
In this case storytelling could have provided Avid’s staff with a way of 
visualizing what the future looks like (Denning, 2011).  Especially in instances 
when a company is traveling through the Neutral Zone, stories allow the 
presenter to transport an audience into the unknown and paint pictures 
describing what the future could hold.  The idea of visualizing the future helps an 
audience understand 1.) they are possibly in an undesirable state, 2.) the 
corporate goal is to reach the end of their transition, 3.) they know about the new 
beginning, and 4) what opportunities for creativity could look like (Bridges, 2003). 
Providing a few easily memorized stories to a group of new employees 
can help elicit strong connections.  These connections build relationships that 
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eventually lead to trust.  After all sharing values enables teams to work together 
while promoting an environment centered in trust (Denning, 2011). 
Lilly had an interesting opportunity here.  Since Avid brought a unique skill 
set into the organization, it might have been appropriate for Lilly’s teams to 
interview Avid’s experts to determine the best way to perform their unique tasks.  
Avid’s employees could revert to telling illustrative stories about manufacturing 
the imaging agent or how they organize regulatory filings (Smith, 2012).  The 
idea is that stories provide a timeline that is easily followed, thus allowing the 
documentation experts at Lilly to “fit” processes that match Avid’s core 
competencies.  This way the Avid employees can see that they actually own the 
process as it is written and they could see their contribution in the transition plans 
(Smith, 2012; Bridges, 2003). 
 
Evolution, Revolution, and Episodic Change 
 
Throughout the post-acquisition process Avid needed to understand its 
current corporate maturity and where they were headed.  Greiner’s Evolution and 
Revolution model (and to a lesser extent Marshak’s gradual change model) 
helped illustrate Avid’s trajectory (Greiner, 1972; Marshak, 2004).  Greiner’s 
model demonstrates that over time an organization needs to experience specific 
stages of growth in order to grow at a given rate.  Within his model he aptly 
accounts for various periods of growth—referred to as evolution—and periods of 
crisis—referred to as revolution (Greiner, 1998).  This model helps illustrate the 
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need for organizations, management, and individuals to continually reinvent 
themselves as their needs change.  Refer to Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Greiner's Evolution and Revolution Model 
 
An interesting element of Greiner’s model is that it isn’t necessarily time-
dependent.  Evolution could require years or decades before witnessing 
Revolution.  Instead the model is dependent on the organization’s Five Phases of 
Growth (Greiner, 1998).  Avid didn’t need to wait decades for their Evolutions and 
Revolutions to occur; however, I have played witness to the first three 
evolutionary phases of growth and two revolutions.  Avid started evolving through 
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creativity before experiencing a revolution of leadership.  The leadership 
revolution was followed by a long period of direction.  Direction lead to the next 
revolution: autonomy.  Following autonomy is our current stage of delegation.   
One might argue that the acquisition catapulted Avid into a period of crisis 
and throughout this period of chaos, Greiner’s model has somehow proven to be 
a source of direction and understanding.  By studying the model itself, Avid’s 
leadership can adopt a roadmap for their next steps.  If we know the next phase 
is control how might Avid plan to embrace the next revolution?  From a 
communication tool perspective, this model becomes an easy illustration to point 
to and show that this type of chaos isn’t just normal, it’s expected! 
Starting from mid-2015, each quarterly company meeting features a 
similar type of illustration.  Marshak and Greiner’s models of change have 
become a standard method of explaining our organization’s metamorphosis—a 
simple way to show where we are with respect to our corporate maturity. 
 
Working With Machines and Organisms 
 
From the day Avid was founded it had proven to be lean, especially from a 
financial perspective.  Avid was effectively a laboratory project that showed 
commercial potential; however, in order to become commercially successful Avid 
first needed to conduct a series of expensive and time consuming clinical trials.  
It was mentioned earlier that leadership was able to secure investments through 
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savvy business arrangement in order to get the dream off the ground.  This 
scrappiness became embedded in the culture. 
Over the first several years of Avid’s existence it generated lean 
documentation practices and found short cuts to shave months off their clinical 
trial timelines.  Cross collaboration was the name of the games and despite 
having departments, there were very few silos.  Leadership often spoke of 
“Industry Paranoia.”  This mentality ensured that we wouldn’t become lazy or 
complacent—competition was around the corner and we needed to be faster, 
leaner, and more prepared to make a splash in the marketplace when our time 
came.   
Avid was Organismic but without a long-term partner the goal of producing 
a commercially viable product was a longshot (Morgan, 2006).  Additionally Avid 
needed to become a learning organization because the landscape of an 
emerging sub-industry was constantly changing and effectively required constant 
double-loop feedback (Morgan, 2006).  These events led Avid to Lilly.   
As it turns out Lilly was really good at designing a stepwise process that 
nearly anybody with the right exposure could perform identically regardless of 
site location.  In other words, a project manager in Japan would need to follow 
the identical process to a project manager in Poland.  Their staff was trained to 
reference process procedures and to carry-out these procedures to the best of 
their ability.  Lilly, like most large corporations, was a Machine and in a Tayloristic 
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way they were dependent on an infrastructure that helped define roles (Morgan, 
2006).  This was, however, done at the expense of being adaptive. 
By the end of the transition most Avid employees started to realize that 
many Lilly processes made sense once they had worked through them.  The 
reverse was also true. As of today Avid is continuing to find ways to “right size” 
processes while trying to find new ways to influence Lilly.  Fortunately Lilly values 
Double-Loop feedback at most levels (Morgan, 2006).   
Small wholly-owned subsidiaries rarely have a chance at making a dent in 
the Big Pharma machine.  It had become evident that we needed a champion 
within Lilly to recognize the benefit of “The Avid Way” and to apply it in some 
instanced.  Fortunately, through the use of political networks Avid and Lilly have 
found a way to work collaboratively by playing to its individual strengths. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Throughout the Organizational Dynamics Program I’ve become 
increasingly inspired to understand innovation and how a corporate environment 
can act as an incubator to cultivate change in a positive way.  I’ve also learned 
that one framework isn’t enough to truly understand the behaviors of a given 
organization.  In this line of thinking it has occurred to me that leaders must 
delicately balance politics, power, flexibility, and control in order to maximize 
output.  Furthermore, we must consider how individuals interact with this complex 
ecosystem.   
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Whether through Evolution v Revolution, metaphors, developmental 
Action Logics, or power, there are countless ways to analyze organizations 
(Greiner, 1998; Morgan, 2006; Torbert, 2004; Quinn, 2010).  Although there are 
endless perspectives to consider it would be fair to say that the perspectives 
reviewed throughout this program have provided me with tremendous value with 
regards to diagnosing and course correction.  Understanding these concepts is 
likened to having a road map. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
Before concluding this capstone, I would like to summarize my thoughts 
and advice for individuals at an acquired company.  My advice is solely based on 
my single case experience and is focused on the process of protecting and 
fostering innovation.  Studying a single case has given me valuable perspective 
for my current role and although each case study is unique, I believe there may 
be enough parallel so that experiences can be applied to other organizations 
regardless of industry.   
In my experience, the process of being acquired has proven to be a 
daunting task.  At the beginning there were more questions than answers; 
however, my education has helped me see the corporate world for what it is.  
Organizations are so wonderfully human and the merging of two organizations 
can be better understood through an organizational dynamics lens.  At the start 
of an acquisition I firmly believe that if one can “see the whole elephant,” share 
perspective, and find meaningful connections, that person can change the vector 
of that organization.  I would also warn about the stories you may assign to the 
acquiring organization. 
“Seeing the whole elephant” has become a common theme throughout my 
time at the University of Pennsylvania and at Avid.  This concept derives from an 
Indian legend of blind men who wanted to study an elephant by feeling it.  One 
man felt the elephant’s trunk and determined that an elephant was like a snake.  
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Another felt it’s leg and resolved an elephant was a pillar.  Finally, a third man felt 
the elephant’s ear and believed it was a rough, leathery fan.  Of course all three 
men were right in a certain sense, but they had not comprehended the entirety of 
the elephant (Meier, 1982).   
The parallel to organizations has become clearer to me over time.  
Throughout the acquisition I found that it was imperative to understand the 
perspective of everyone impacted by the merging of two teams.  For instance, 
Avid might have felt like its innovative culture was being interrupted while our 
colleagues at Lilly might have felt threatened by a new technologies that they 
couldn’t fully understand.  Another example was related to processes.  Lilly 
needed clearly defined processes since standardization was interwoven with its 
identity.  On the other hand, Avid enjoyed a more relaxed body of standards 
because it was creating imaging tracers that have never been created before—
how could it know what standards or controls were needed?   
By “seeing the whole elephant” Avid would be able to understand Lilly’s 
perspective, and vice versa.  Different methods and values do not necessarily 
mean one company is right and the other is wrong; however, it is important to 
share perspectives and be open to new ways of looking at the world.  At the 
onset of the acquisition some Avid team members had dug in their heels and 
refused to change.  This was one way of trying to protect themselves against 
change but this stubbornness proved to be ineffective.  Alternatively, the 
members who were most effective openly communicated and shared their 
73 
 
perspective.  These individuals recognized that if there was something worth 
protecting (e.g. innovative characteristics) then they should be vocal and clearly 
describe their position.    
Another core element to finding success through an acquisition is 
relationship management.  Building a network within the acquiring organization 
had proven to be one of the most important assets to an influencer.  Remember 
that organizations are comprised of humans with various wants and needs.  By 
creating meaningful connections you create opportunities to express your 
perspective, drive positive change, and become recognized as a contributing 
team member; however, there are some pitfalls to building these networks.  For 
instance, be cautious not to blindly follow leaders.  Understand the goals of your 
leadership and align yourself with leaders who think beyond a limited scope.  Be 
sure leadership understands your goals and ambitions, otherwise you might find 
yourself on the wrong career path.  I have found it is also important to be true to 
yourself and offer unique insight when opportunities present themselves.   
Last, be cautious of the stories you assign to people, processes, and 
groups.  In the early phases of the acquisition I recall some Avid team members 
expressing concern about Lilly and their "machine-like processes.  I was among 
the masses who were anxiously entering the Neutral Zone (Bridges, 2003).  
There were concerns with “fit” and a general sense of negative change on the 
horizon.  These were, of course, stories we told ourselves about Big Pharma 
acquiring a small company.    
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After a short period of time we realized that these stories were generated 
to make sense of the situation we were in.  In fact my experience proved that the 
story I had told myself was entirely wrong.  In general, Lilly had welcomed 
different perspectives and have worked hard to find ways to encourage Avid’s 
input.  This spirit of hospitality helped foster relationships built on trust and 
understanding.  
These concepts from Organizational Dynamics proved to be valuable 
additions to my management “toolbox.”  I have found some success in socializing 
these ideas, models, and theories with leaders and followers alike.  My 
appreciation for organizational understanding is continually rekindled when I look 
back at my questions/learnings and look forward to the next steps on my journey.  
Understanding how organizations function—macroscopically and 
microscopically—continues to fascinate and amaze.  
 
Proposed Next Steps for Continuous Learning 
 
Statistically speaking, many mergers and acquisitions (herein M&A) 
ultimately fail to add value to companies (Knowledge@Wharton, 2005).  In fact, a 
common documented range for failure is between 50% and 80% 
(Knowledge@Wharton, 2005).  This has not been the case for the acquisition 
described throughout this paper, and I would consider Lilly’s acquisition of Avid to 
be a success story. 
75 
 
While not covered in this capstone I believe that there are rich 
opportunities to evaluate the difference between failed and successful M&As 
through an organizational dynamics lens.  While some M&As might fail for 
various reasons, perhaps due to financial issues, obsolete technology, or poor 
strategy decisions, there could be other instances of failures that are related to 
ineffective people management.  Even in cases where M&As have been 
successful, I submit that applying organizational dynamics practices could help 
provide a smoother transition. 
Undoubtedly plenty of research exists that describes why M&As fail.  
Many analysts consider “clashing corporate cultures as one of the most 
significant obstacles” to post-acquisition integration (Knowledge@Wharton, 
2005), yet I would be most interested in studying the ecosystems where 
innovation flourishes or flounders.  What is the make-up of the leadership in the 
acquiring organization?  What about the leadership in the acquired organization?  
Are there indicators that could be used to predict success?  If so, how could we 
better prepare acquirers and acquirees to ensure a successful acquisition?  
These questions, among others, remain on my professional and academic 
horizon. 
 
Final Thoughts 
 
The past several years have been an enlightening experience that has 
driven personal change.  I’ve learned from respected colleagues, leaders, and 
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professors from various walks of life.  I’ve learned about perspective, change, 
negotiations, leadership, followership, politics, sustainability, storytelling, and 
countless other organizational dynamic elements that have shifted my way of 
seeing the world.    
The next phase of the journey is the most critical since it consists of 
continuing to apply my tapestry of knowledge in real-world scenarios.  My goal is 
to ensure that all of my learnings—past, present, and future—are tied into a 
cohesive story that helps organizations understand how to grow while staying 
true to their innovative roots.   
At the onset of this capstone, Avid was functioning in a supporting role 
within Lilly’s AD unit and appeared tied to the successes or failures based on the 
outcome of their collective research.  If Lilly’s pipeline is successful, they would 
need Avid’s support for a very long time.  If the pipeline is unsuccessful, all signs 
show that Avid would be sold to another pharmaceutical company who has a 
need for their diagnostic imaging agent.  This all changed in at the beginning of 
this year. 
In January 2016, after acting as a wholly-owned subsidiary for five years, 
Avid officially became Lilly.  We now share the same tools, benefits, systems, 
human resources, and data.  Avid had proven to be a competent acquisition by 
Lilly and Lilly had decided that we should be tied together in the long-haul.   
The journey doesn’t end there.  Avid still functions as a cutting edge 
radiopharmaceutical group in Philadelphia and we are charged with supporting 
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some of the largest AD trials in the world today.  Innovation is what got us here 
and innovation will keep us on the cutting edge. 
Although there are endless perspectives to consider it would be fair to say 
that the organizational dynamics concepts reviewed throughout this program 
have provided me with tremendous value with regards to understanding the 
human components of organizations.  Organizations are complex entities with 
many moving parts.  Applying various organizational dynamics lens have helped 
by providing clarity and guidance.  As Quinn said, “Organizations do not exist in a 
vacuum,” so let’s continue to study and understand organizations with the goal of 
making them better (Quinn, 2010, p 254). 
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ENDNOTES 
i Although not covered within this capstone, Lilly’s option to “buy” and not “rent” Avid’s services suggest 
Avid was more than an acquisition target for their pipeline.  I can see an extension from this paper that 
would explore the differences between routine acquisition and a strategic partnership through acquisition. 
ii Private Source, internal at Avid 
iii Internal Communication, Company Meeting September 2015 
iv Internal Communication, Company Meeting September 2015 
v Internal Communication, Management Meeting December 2015 
vi Working in the “now: is a common expression used by leadership at Avid 
vii Common euphemism used at Lilly and Avid to describe Lilly’s culture 
 
                                                 
